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Abstract
Recent research suggests that auction winners sometimes fall prey to a “bidder’s
curse”, paying more for an item at auction than they would have paid at a posted
price. One explanation for this phenomenon is that bidders are inattentive to posted
prices. We develop a model in which bidders’ inattention, and subsequent overbid-
ding, is driven by a rational response to the opportunity cost of acquiring infor-
mation about the posted price. We test our model in a laboratory experiment in
which subjects bid in an auction while facing an opportunity cost of looking up the
posted price. We vary the opportunity cost, and we show that information acqui-
sition decreases and consequently overbidding increases with opportunity cost as
predicted.
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There is no ‘imperfection’ in a market possessing incomplete knowledge if it
would not be remunerative to acquire (produce) complete knowledge: infor-
mation costs are the costs of transportation from ignorance to omniscience,
and seldom can a trader afford to take the entire trip. ∼ (Stigler, 1967)
1 Introduction
Overbidding in auctions has been observed in a wide range of scenarios ranging from
private-value second-price auctions to common-value auctions of many formats in both
the lab and the field (Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Cooper and Fang, 2008;
Kagel and Levin, 1986; Klemperer, 2002; Levin and Reiss, 2017). These pathological cases
frequently result in a “winner’s curse” in which the winner of the auction pays more for
the item than it is actually worth. A different form of overbidding has been documented
among eBay bidders who sometimes overpay in auctions relative to a simultaneously
available fixed-price (Malmendier and Lee, 2011; Jones, 2011). Bidders subject to the
“bidder’s curse” fail to maximize their gains from exchange; however, paying more than
a simultaneous fixed-price need not imply that the final price exceeds the buyer’s value.
In the case of overpayment relative to a simultaneous fixed price on eBay, the proffered
explanation is that bidders “fail to pay sufficient attention to their outside options, espe-
cially when rebidding” (Malmendier and Lee, 2011, p. 776). However, it is still unclear
why individuals fail to pay ‘sufficient’ attention. Malmendier and Lee (2011) suggest that
the source of limited attention is non-rational, but Schneider (2016) suggests that some
overbidding might be explained as a rational response to search costs – rational ignorance.
In the context of eBay, the time and effort cost of researching the posted price, which we
will refer to as opportunity cost, seems to be a plausible explanation. Search results are
quite sensitive to the particular search terms used and frequently return a large number of
items that vary in relevance, condition, and along other dimensions (Schneider, 2016). In
field data, the opportunity costs of research are uncontrolled and unobservable, and thus
what looks like insufficient attention may instead be (at least in part) rational ignorance.
To address this limitation, we design a laboratory experiment to directly test whether the
opportunity cost of looking up a fixed price can account for the bidder’s curse in auctions
where opportunity costs are controlled and partially observed.
In our setting, subjects participate in a sequence of induced private value, ascending
clock auctions for goods that are subsequently available for purchase at a fixed price drawn
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from a known distribution.1 Each subject demands a single unit and values the unit
sufficiently that she will strictly prefer to purchase at the fixed price if she is unsuccessful
in the auction. To learn the actual fixed price before bidding, subjects must forgo the
opportunity to earn money in an individual effort task. Thus in deciding whether to
research the fixed price, subjects face a tradeoff between this opportunity cost and the
expected savings from making an informed bid.2
We provide a benchmark theoretical model in which rational ignorance is an equilib-
rium outcome when the opportunity cost of becoming informed is sufficiently high. In
the model, rational ignorance generates behavior consistent with the bidder’s curse be-
cause uninformed agents sometimes bid above the fixed price. By varying the piece rate
of our experimental effort task, our design allows us to observe the information acqui-
sition strategies of subjects with varying opportunity costs and their bidding behavior
conditional on whether they have observed the fixed price.
We find evidence that buyers who face higher opportunity costs of learning the fixed
price are less likely to learn, and hence more likely to overbid, the fixed price. However,
when the opportunity cost of researching the fixed price is high, auction winners who
choose not to research the fixed price receive significantly higher payoffs than those who
do since their earnings from the effort task more than offset their occasional losses from
overbidding. Our analysis shows that opportunity cost-driven overbidding is not harmful
on net.
Existing field studies offer suggestive evidence to support theoretical claims that op-
portunity cost plays an important role in bidding behavior (e.g. Backus et al., 2014;
Schneider, 2016), albeit without observing or controlling opportunity cost. In laboratory
auctions in which the item is alternatively available at a fixed price any time until the
auction starts, Durham et al. (2013) observe bids in excess of the posted price in only 4
out of 359 observations, suggesting that limited attention is a weak constraint in a zero-
opportunity cost environment.3 Other evidence from internet auctions suggests a role for
more careful attention to quasi-rational explanations as opposed to behavioral biases (e.g.
Podwol and Schneider, 2016).
1For a discussion of these “English clock” auctions, see Cassady (1980); McCabe et al. (1990).
2Because the fixed price is common to all bidders in an auction and because bidders have single unit
demand, our auctions are equivalent to second-price common-value auctions, with the common value
being the fixed price, so long as bidders are fully rational. Informed bidders observe this common value
while uninformed bidders do not.
3Data on overbidding collected via personal communication with the authors.
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A separate bidding puzzle in ascending auctions is the observation that bidders some-
times increase their bids by more than the minimum increment, a phenomenon known
as “jump bidding” (see e.g. Cramton, 1997; Christopher, 1998). Our proposed explana-
tion for the bidder’s curse parallels attempts to explain jump bidding via time and effort
opportunity costs (Easley and Tenorio, 2004; Isaac et al., 2007). For example, Easley
and Tenorio (2004), studying data from online auctions, provide a model in which the
opportunity cost of repeatedly logging into an auction website to increase one’s bid leads
bidders to make jump bids in equilibrium. Similarly, rational ignorance could account
for “shipping-fee neglect” in online purchases (see e.g. Hossain and Morgan, 2006; Brown
et al., 2010).
2 Theory
In our setting there are n ≥ 2 players, who each demand a single unit of a good. The
good is sold in both a second-price ascending clock auction and an aftermarket. One unit
of the good is available in the auction, but an unlimited quantity of the good is available
in an aftermarket at a fixed price. The aftermarket price, q, is not initially observed by
players, but is commonly known to be drawn from cumulative distribution function G
which admits a probability density function and has support on [q, q] where q ≥ 0. A
given player i values one unit of the good at vi, which she privately observes, but vi is
commonly known to satisfy vi ≥ q.
Each player first bids in the auction, and if she does not win the auction, she can
instead buy the good in the aftermarket. However, each player may choose to privately
observe the aftermarket price before the auction starts, but doing so for agent i is costly.
In particular, looking up the price requires forgoing a task with individual reward, ci.
This reward is privately observed by i and is known to be drawn independently according
to the cumulative distribution function F . A player’s lookup decision is also her private
information.
Our environment closely approximates the situation faced by an eBay bidder who has
recently been outbid and must choose whether to continue to increase her bid.4 When
eBay bidders are outbid, they receive a notification by email that they are no longer
the high bidder. They then must choose whether to increase their bid and also whether
4Ariely et al. (2005) and Roth and Ockenfels (2002) argue that second-price auctions can be considered
stylized versions of those run at eBay, where initial data on overbidding fixed price options was collected.
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to devote some of their valuable time to researching other purchase options (like eBay’s
Buy-It-Now price, or fixed price options from other sellers, which are equivalent to our
aftermarket price). Here we ask whether it is ever rational ex ante to overbid these fixed
price options.
2.1 Preview of the Analysis
Formally, a strategy for player i prescribes her information acquisition as a function of
her realized vi and ci; the price at which she drops out of the ascending auction (her bid)
conditional on her information acquisition, vi, and ci; and her decision of whether or not
to acquire the good in the aftermarket conditional on losing the auction and on vi, ci, her
information acquisition, and her bid.
Below, we assume that all players are risk neutral and construct an essentially unique
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game. This PBE is described by an
information acquisition function ι and an uninformed bid b? such that each player follows
the strategy given by (A)-(D) below:
(A) Each player acquires information with probability ι(ci) when her type is (vi, ci).
(B) Each player, conditional on becoming informed that the aftermarket price is q, bids
q in the auction.
(C) Each player, conditional on remaining uninformed, bids b? in the auction.
(D) All types always buy in the aftermarket conditional on losing the auction.
Characterizing a PBE involves finding the restrictions on ι and b? that make the
strategies described by (A)-(D) consistent with PBE. We construct the PBE by first
finding the optimal bid of a player, given her information about the aftermarket price and
conditional on the information acquisition strategies of others. We then characterize the
value of information and derive a subject’s information acquisition strategy. In the PBE,
agents acquire information according to a cutoff strategy in opportunity cost, becoming
informed only when the expected value of being informed exceeds the opportunity cost
of acquiring information. Then given their information, agents bid either the expected
aftermarket price (if uninformed) or the actual aftermarket price (if informed). When
some bidders are uninformed, this equilibrium may generate both over- and under-bidding
in the auction stage, relative to the aftermarket price. Thus, with positive opportunity
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costs of information acquisition, rationally ignorant bidders exhibit behavior that looks
like the “bidder’s curse”.
2.2 Bidding strategies conditional on information
A player’s optimal bid in the auction depends on whether she is informed about the
aftermarket price, q. Note that since vi ≥ q ∀i, players will always prefer to purchase the
good at a price q in the aftermarket if they do not buy during the auction. Thus, for
an informed player, a bid of q in the auction weakly dominates all other bids. Bidding
q both ensures that the player will never overpay relative to the aftermarket price and
maximizes the probability of winning the item at a price below q, should other players
underbid. Since the price paid by the auction winner is unaffected by her own bid, it
follows that this strategy minimizes her expected price paid. Thus, we look for a PBE in
which informed bidders always bid q.
Knowing this, when we define the optimal bid for uninformed bidders, it must be a
best response when all informed bidders bid q. Suppose for now that all other players
become informed with probability ρ, and further suppose they bid q when informed and
b? when uninformed. The ex post price paid by player i from bidding bi then depends
on whether she wins the auction and whether the second-highest bid was made by an
informed or uninformed bidder:
Case I: max b−i is made by an informed player.
Here i always pays q ex post, whether in the auction or the aftermarket. If bi < max b−i
she loses the auction and pays q in the aftermarket. If bi > max b−i = q, she wins the
auction and pays q.
Case II: max b−i is made by an uninformed player.
Here i will either pay q or b? ex post, depending on whether she wins the auction. If
she submits any bid b′i < b
? she loses the auction and pays q in the aftermarket. If she
submits any bid b′′i > b
?, she wins the auction and pays b?. If instead, she bids bi = b
?,
the tie-breaking rule ensures that she sometimes wins and sometimes loses the auction,
paying b? if she wins and q in the aftermarket if she loses.
Using the ex post prices in Cases I and II, the expected price paid by any uninformed
player is equal to the probability of Case I times the expected value of q plus the probability
of Case II times her expected price in Case II, which is a convex combination of b? and
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the expected value of q. Using this, we can evaluate the expected prices that would result
from bids greater than and less than b?. When player i bids b?, her distribution over ex
post prices is a convex combination of the price resulting from bidding b′i < b
? and b′′i > b
?
and so is her ex ante expected price. For bidding b? to be a best-reply for i, she must be
indifferent between always winning and always losing to an uninformed bid; otherwise,
she would strictly prefer to bid above or below b?. This provides the restriction for b? to
be the PBE bid of all uninformed players.
Uninformed bidders pay an expected price of Eq since bidding below b? always leads
to an ex post price of q either in the auction or aftermarket. Deriving the corresponding
value for bidding above b? and equating the expected prices faced by i when bidding any
b′i < b
? and when bidding any b′′i > b
? gives the restriction that:
Eq = (1− ρ)n−1b? + ρn−1Eq + (1− ρn−1 − (1− ρ)n−1)
 q∫
q
max[b?, q]dG(q)
 .
Rearranging the above gives:
(1− ρ)n−1 [Eq − b?] = (1− (ρ)n−1 − (1− ρ)n−1)
 q∫
q
max[0, b? − q]dG(q)
 . (1)
When n = 2, the right-hand side of (1) equals zero, and thus b? = Eq. But when n > 2,
(1) implicitly defines the uninformed bid b? given ρ, the probability of becoming informed.5
Since the implied b? exceeds q, it follows that uninformed players will sometimes overbid
(and sometimes underbid) the aftermarket price. The bidding strategy of an uninformed
player thus generates behavior consistent with the “bidder’s curse”. It remains to be
shown that some bidders will choose to be uninformed in equilibrium.
2.3 Information acquisition
Given what we have shown so far about bidding strategies, we can now consider the costs
and benefits of becoming informed before bidding in the auction. Information acquisition
is costly because player i must forgo ci to become informed. Acquiring information is
beneficial because it eliminates the possibility of overpaying relative to the aftermarket
5See Lemma 1 in Appendix A for the full argument.
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price and raises the likelihood of getting a bargain in the auction against uninformed
bidders whenever b? < q. We characterize the PBE information acquisition strategy in
which a player becomes informed whenever these expected benefits exceed the costs, given
the expected information acquisition strategies of others.
Let ι represent the information acquisition strategy of−i. If i has rational expectations
about others’ behavior, then i’s ex ante assessment of the probability of each other player
becoming informed, ρ, is given by:
ρ =
∫
ι(c)dF (c) (2)
Using the bidding strategies of −i derived above, an informed bidder pays a price q
either in the auction or the aftermarket whenever at least one other bidder is informed,
but pays the minimum of q and b? when no other player is informed. Thus the expected
price paid, conditional on choosing to lookup the aftermarket price, is given by
(1− ρ)n−1
∫
min[q, b?]dG(q) + pn−1Eq +
(
1− ρn−1 − (1− ρ)n−1)Eq.
As noted earlier, in equilibrium, uninformed bidders pay an expected price of Eq. The
expected savings from acquiring information is then given by
(1− ρ)n−1
∫
max[0, q − b?]dG(q) (3)
Notice that, conditional on b?, the value of becoming informed is declining in ρ; that
is, players’ information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes. This is because
when other players are likely to be informed, it is more likely that all other bids in the
auction will equal the aftermarket price, which eliminates the benefit of being informed.
In contrast, when no other bidders are informed, then a given bidder who looks up the
price can save q − b? whenever q > b?, though the probability of getting these savings
decreases as ρ increases.
In equilibrium, each player acquires information when the value of information, (3), is
greater than ci and remains uninformed whenever it is less than ci. Thus i follows ι if it
is consistent with the cutoff strategy:
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c¯ = (1− ρ)n−1
∫
max[0, q − b?]dG(q) (4)
ι(c) = 1 if c > c¯ (5)
ι(c) = 0 if c < c¯ (6)
These equations together with (2) fully characterize an ι consistent with symmetric
PBE, given b?.6 Thus agents weigh the benefits of avoiding overpaying (and potentially
underpaying), relative to q, against their opportunity costs, and some will find it rational
to remain ignorant.
If ρ = 1, then an uninformed bidder pays an expected price of Eq (regardless of her
bid in the auction), as does an informed bidder. But then if ci > 0, a player is strictly
better off by remaining uninformed. Thus so long as F (0) < 1, some bidders will choose
to remain uninformed in equilibrium. Since opportunity costs are rarely zero, our theory
predicts that rationally ignorant agents will be present in both lab and field markets and
will influence auction prices.7
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium described is summarized in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. Existence of Symmetric PBE
The game described above has a symmetric PBE which can be described by an infor-
mation acquisition function ι and an uninformed bid b? that satisfy (1)-(6) such that each
player follows the strategy given by (A)-(D).
In this equilibrium, if F (0) < 1 then ρ < 1, and if F (
∫
max[0, q −Eq]dG(q)) > 0 then
ρ > 0.
6Note that if F has mass points, (4) - (6) also pin down the probability of acquiring information at
c¯, ι(c¯) ∈ [0, 1], when necessary. The right-hand side of (4) is weakly positive, strictly decreasing in ρ,
and takes all values between 0 and
∫
max[0, q − b?]dG(q) ≥ 0. To find the cutoff value c¯, substitute in
ρ = F (c¯) into the right-hand side, and starting at c¯ = 0, increase c¯ on the right-hand side of the equation
until the first point at which the right-hand side is weakly less than the left-hand side. This point is the
desired c¯. If the right-hand side is strictly below c¯ at this point, we can find a ρ =∈ [lim
c↑c¯
F (c), F (c¯)] to
make the desired equality hold, pinning down ι(c¯).
7If ρ = 0, then by (1), uninformed agents would bid Eq. Then by (3) would find it worthwhile to
become informed if
∫
max[0, q − Eq]dG(q) > ci. Thus so long as F (
∫
max[0, q − Eq]dG(q)) > 0, some
bidders will choose to become informed in equilibrium.
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Uniqueness of the Symmetric PBE In Appendix A, we show that in every symmet-
ric PBE, types who become informed bid the aftermarket price, q, with a probability of 1;
types who remain uninformed pay an expected price of Eq. Thus, information acquisition
decisions are given by a cutoff strategy in ci consistent with (4)-(6).
Below we describe an experiment that allows us to test the behavioral implications of
symmetric PBE, in particular on overbidding (relative to q) and rational ignorance.
3 Experimental Design, Procedures, and Predictions
The experiment consists of two parts, the “Productivity Measurement” part and the
“Market” part. In the “Productivity Measurement” part, each subject participates in
three, two-minute periods of a real-effort ‘slider task’ due to Gill and Prowse (2012) with
a break of one minute in between periods. Subjects observe a screen with 48 sliders, each
representing a scale from 0 to 100 (See Figure B5 in Appendix B below). The sliders are
initially set to “0”, and subjects receive a payment k∗ = 1 Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) for each slider that they set to “50” by the end of the two minutes. Observing
behavior in this part allows us to control for individual skill heterogeneity when attempting
to understand the role of opportunity cost in influencing bidding behavior.
After the Productivity Measurement part, subjects participate in the Market part,
consisting of T = 16 unrelated markets in which they attempt to buy a single unit of a
fictitious item. In each market, one unit of supply is available in an ascending auction,
and – after the auction ends – unlimited supply is available at a fixed price for those who
did not obtain the unit in the auction and still wish to purchase it. At the beginning
of each market, subjects observe their induced value for the item, and the distribution
from which the fixed price is drawn. Importantly, if they want to learn the actual fixed
price before bidding in the auction, they must choose to forgo the opportunity to earn
additional income in another 30 seconds of the slider task, where they receive k ECU
per correctly placed slider. Hence, by varying the value of k in the slider task, we vary
the opportunity cost ci of looking up the fixed price, and we can observe the effect of
opportunity cost on the probability of overbidding in the auction.
Next, those subjects who choose not to lookup the fixed price participate in 30 seconds
of the slider task in which each correctly placed slider yields a return of k, while those
who choose to forgo the slider task can observe the fixed price displayed on their screens
for 30 seconds. At the end of the 30 seconds, subjects submit their bids in the clock
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auction with the highest bidder winning the auction and paying the second-highest bid.
To ensure that we observe the high bid, bidders did not observe the dropping behavior
of their competitors and the auction clock stopped when the last bidder dropped from
the auction. Then, each subject learns whether they were able to purchase the good at
auction and the auction price, and those subjects who were unsuccessful are then given the
opportunity to purchase the item at the fixed price. Just before the decision to purchase
is made, the fixed price is revealed to all remaining buyers at no cost, and subjects simply
choose whether or not to buy at the revealed price. This concludes the first market. At
the end of the first market, the second market begins, and so on until all 16 markets have
closed.
Each market consists of n = 2 bidders chosen from a matching group of size N = 8.
For each market, each subject receives a randomly drawn integer value denominated in
Experimental Currency Units, v ∼ U [50, 100], and we draw the fixed price, q ∼ U [0, 50],
to ensure that the possibility of overbidding (almost) always exists. Over the sequence
of 16 markets, the value of k in the slider task varies randomly. Specifically, k is drawn
independently for each bidder from the set {0, 0.25, 3, 6} with equal probability of each
value.8 We randomly rematch within groups so that each bidder faces each value of k
four times, on average. Hence, we are able to capture the benefits of both a between and
within subjects comparison of the treatment effect.
Subjects are rematched across markets and receive no additional information about
the other bidders in their market. The bidder’s role is framed as that of a seller facing the
opportunity of buying several commodities in the markets for resale to the experimenters,
one commodity per market. One advantage of this framing is that it better motivates
participation in multiple markets. In the auction stage of the market, the clock starts at
0, and increases in unit increments until a price of 105 ECU. At any time, each bidder can
press a button labeled “Stop Bidding” to drop out of the auction; their bid is given by
the price at which they stop bidding. Once both bidders have dropped out, each bidder is
informed whether they won the auction and the price at which the earliest bidder dropped
out, which gives the price paid by the winning bidder (as in a second-price auction).
We employ an ascending auction because this has been shown to facilitate compre-
hension and reduce overbidding relative to sealed-bid alternatives (Kagel et al., 1987).
8We also ran two unreported pilot sessions with k ∈ {0, 0.25, 1, 5}. We obtained qualitatively similar
results but less overbidding of the posted price with these parameter values, which is consistent with our
predictions.
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Eliciting drop-out prices from all bidders represents a deviation from the typical clock
auction, but it allows us to observe the entire distribution of bids, so that we can test
the full set of predictions from our theory.9 See Appendix B below for screenshots and a
complete set of instructions.
At the end of the experiment, we randomly select one market for each subject for
payment. ECUs are converted to Canadian dollars at a rate of 10 ECU = $1. Then
subjects receive private cash payments including a $7 payment for arriving to the experi-
ment on time, their earnings from the Productivity Measurement stage, and their earnings
from the randomly selected market (including what they earned in the slider task, if they
participated). Prior to beginning the incentivized markets, subjects participated in two
practice markets that were unpaid to familiarize themselves with the environment.
In total we ran 8 sessions of 8 subjects drawn from the undergraduate population of
a mid-sized North American university (Average age = 22, 38% Male). Subjects from all
disciplines are invited to sign up for our online recruitment system. We emailed a subset
of eligible students invitations at random. The only restriction on participation was that
the subjects could not have any prior experience in this experiment. On average, subjects
earned $19 for a 90-minute session, including show-up payment.
3.1 Predictions
Here, we detail the behavioral implications of the symmetric PBE for our experiment
where n = 2. The model introduced in section 2 shows how the opportunity cost of
researching the aftermarket price leads to behavior that looks like the bidder’s curse.
In our model, all informed bidders bid q and therefore never overbid the aftermarket
price. Uninformed bidders, however, always bid Eq, and when Eq > q, they will overbid
the aftermarket price (which occurs half of the time in equilibrium.) The presence of
uninformed bidders is entirely driven by the opportunity cost of looking up the aftermarket
price. When the cost of acquiring this information is sufficiently high, bidders find it in
their interest to remain uninformed, and as a result, they may overbid the aftermarket
price. We state four testable predictions of our model below:
1. Overbidding Overbidding relative to the aftermarket price is increasing in the cost
of acquiring information.
9See also Engelmann and Wolfstetter (2009) who provide evidence that the standard clock auction
conceals overbidding due to selection bias. As we show below, this is consistent with our observations.
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2. Information Acquisition Each player follows a cutoff information acquisition strat-
egy: there exists a cutoff c¯i such that the player looks up the price whenever ci > c¯i and
does not look it up whenever ci < c¯i.
3. Rationality of Inattention Uninformed bidders achieve higher payoffs, on aver-
age, than they would have by acquiring information, even when their bid exceeds the
aftermarket price.
4. Bidding Strategies Informed bidders bid q, while uninformed bidders bid Eq and
are, hence, equally likely to over- and under-bid the aftermarket price.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Opportunity Cost and Overbidding
Our data consist of 1024 price lookup and bidding decisions from 512 markets. Overall,
we observe 510 (∼50%) instances in which bidders lookup the aftermarket price and
463 (45%) instances of overbidding the aftermarket price. On average, when informed,
subjects bid 27 (median 25), and when uninformed they bid 32 (median 30). Among
the overbids, 294 (63%) are made by uninformed bidders, and of the 344 sizable overbids
(bi,t − qt > 5), the number made by uninformed bidders is 244 (71%). Figure 1 displays
the relationship between bids and fixed prices conditional on the decision to lookup the
aftermarket price for each value of k. The figure also displays equilibrium predictions and
OLS fits to the data.
As expected, bids often correspond to the fixed price when a bidder is informed, and
we observe substantial overbidding, particularly when bidders are uninformed. Under the
theory, the probability of remaining uninformed (and hence overbidding) is increasing in
the expected value of the individual effort task. Summary statistics reported in Table 1
indicate both that the probability of looking up the fixed price is decreasing in k and that
the probability of overbidding is higher when bidders choose not to lookup the fixed price.
Overall, 23% of the auctions ended up with prices greater than the aftermarket price.10
10Recall that we conducted auctions with two bidders. With more than two bidders, the probability of
overpaying may increase.
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Figure 1: The relationship between bids and fixed prices by opportunity cost level and
the decision to lookup the fixed price
k Pr(Lookup) Pr(Overbid|Lookup) Pr(Overbid|NoLookup) Pr(Overbid)
0 .93 .35 .59 .37
0.25 .77 .26 .60 .34
3 .26 .36 .54 .49
6 .10 .54 .59 .59
Total .50 .33 .57 .45
N 1024 510 514 1024
Table 1: Summary statistics on the probability of overbidding, conditional on k.
To support these observations statistically and to explain both the decision to lookup
the fixed price and the probability of overbidding (relative to the fixed price) in the
auction, we estimate a system of two seemingly unrelated probit equations. In the first
equation, the dependent variable λ takes a value of 1 if the bidder chose to lookup the
fixed price and a value of 0 otherwise; the independent variables include a constant term,
and the expected earnings of the slider task (computed as the product of the piece rate, kt,
and the number of sliders a subject correctly placed in part I (Productivity Measurement),
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eIi , which measures individual productivity at the slider task). In the second equation,
the dependent variable θ takes a value of 1 if a bidder bid more than the fixed price in
the auction and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are a dummy variable indicating
whether the subject chose to lookup the fixed price and a subject’s value for the item.
We also include a control for the fixed price, since overbidding should be less likely, the
higher is the fixed price. In both equations, standard errors are clustered at the subject
level to control for heteroskedasticity.
λi = α0 + α1ki,te
I
i +  (7)
θi = β0 + β1λi,t + β2vi,t + β3qt +  (8)
Table 2 displays the output of the regression; one session is excluded from the regres-
sion because a software error left us without an estimate of productivity for those subjects
(eIi ).
11 As expected, in equation (7) the estimated coefficient on kt × eIi is negative and
significant indicating that the probability of looking up the fixed price decreases with a
subject’s opportunity cost. Moreover, in equation (8), a negative and significant esti-
mated coefficient on the decision to lookup the fixed price indicates that overbidding is
significantly driven by opportunity cost. When bidders choose to lookup the price, they
are significantly less likely to overbid than when they instead choose to participate in the
slider task.
Finding 1: Overbidding relative to the aftermarket price increases as the opportunity
cost of becoming informed increases.
4.2 Information Acquisition and the Rationality of Inattention
Under the theory, individuals acquire information only when doing so is worthwhile. In
particular, theory predicts that individuals follow a cutoff strategy, acquiring information
whenever their opportunity cost is sufficiently low – that is, whenever ki,t is below a
subject-specific threshold that depends in the experiment on a subject’s productivity in
the slider task. We test whether subjects play cutoff strategies using lookup decisions
for each subject at each level of k. We find that 50 out of 64 subjects (78%) use a
11Our results are robust to including that session and replacing ki,te
I
i with ki,t in the selection equation.
Estimates available upon request.
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Estimates
Eq. 7: Lookup
Expected Earnings -0.029∗∗∗
(k × eIi ) (0.003)
Constant 0.952∗∗∗
(0.131)
Eq. 8: Overbid
Lookup (λi,t) -0.679
∗∗∗
(0.180)
Value (vi,t) 0.010
∗∗∗
(0.003)
Posted Price (qt) -0.037
∗∗∗
(0.004)
Constant 0.356
(0.249)
Log Lik. -872.059
N 896
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Bivariate probit regression explaining the probability of looking up the after-
market price and the probability of overbidding.
cutoff strategy; that is, there is a cutoff value k¯i such that subject i always looks up the
aftermarket price when ki,t < k¯i, but never looks it up when ki,t > k¯i.
While adherence to cutoff strategies is perfect for a large majority of subjects, a weaker
test reported in Table 2 strongly confirms the comparative static prediction that subjects
are less likely to lookup the aftermarket price when their opportunity cost of doing so, as
measured by their expected earnings in the slider task, is higher.
Finding 2: Subjects generally acquire information about the aftermarket price in a
manner consistent with a cutoff strategy.
A disadvantage of a cutoff strategy in which a bidder sometimes remains uninformed
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is that it can lead to the bidder’s curse, where the auction winner pays a price exceeding
the aftermarket price. In equilibrium, this can occur if both bidders remain uninformed.
Thus, under the theory, it is individually rational to occasionally fall prey to the bidder’s
curse, because avoiding it in any circumstance is too costly.
To see the empirical earnings impact of remaining uninformed, we estimate a linear
panel regression, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and random effects for
each subject to control for individual differences, where the dependent variable is the total
net gain of an auction winner i in market t (pii,t), relative to obtaining the good in the
aftermarket. Let pt represent the price paid by the winning bidder in the auction during
market t (which is always less than or equal to the winning bid), and let qt represent the
fixed price at which the item can be purchased in the aftermarket. The winning bidder’s
earnings from the auction are then qt − pt. However, this is not the only component of
earnings during a market since bidders may also participate in 30 seconds of the effort
task to earn additional money. Let eIIt be the number of sliders correctly adjusted in
market t during part II; then total earnings from the effort task are kte
II
t , where kt is the
value of correctly adjusting a single slider. Thus, we define total net gains in market t as
pit = kte
II
t + (qt − pt).12 The independent variables of the regression include a constant
term, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the bidder was uninformed and
0 otherwise (!λi,t), and an interaction between the uninformed dummy variable and the
slider task earnings (kte
II
i,t).
pii,t = γ0 + γ1!λi,t + γ2!λi,tkte
II
i,t + ηi +  (9)
Table 3 reports the output of this regression. A positive and significant coefficient on
the constant term indicates that informed bidders stand to gain approximately 9 ECU
in the auction. Uninformed bidders sacrifice approximately 4 ECU because they tend to
overbid the aftermarket price; however, we can reject the hypothesis that an uninformed
bidder who earned nothing in the slider task would receive a total payoff of 0 (i.e. a Wald
test that γ0 + γ1 = 0 yields χ
2 = 7.51, p-value < 0.01). In this auction, an uninformed
bidder can still get a deal when her counterpart underbids but will never overpay the
aftermarket price when her counterpart overbids her. The coefficient on the interaction
term (mechanically) equals 1, and evaluated at the mean of kte
II
i,t, which is 13, we can
reject the null hypothesis that uninformed bidders and informed bidders receive the same
12Our analysis in this section is in terms of experimental earnings and ignores any utility/disutility of
the real effort task captured in the di term of the model in Section 2.
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mean payments in favor of the alternative that uninformed bidders’ earnings are greater
(a Wald test that γ1 + 13 ∗ γ2 = 0, yields χ2 = 28.53, p-value < 0.01).
Total Net Gains
(pii,t)
No Lookup, (!λi,t) -4.35
∗∗
(1.88)
Slider Task Earnings 0.97∗∗∗
(!λi,t × kt × eIIi,t) (0.04)
Constant 8.84∗∗∗
(1.14)
R2 0.62
N 512
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Panel linear regression explaining the total payoffs earned by auction winners.
Finding 3: On average, uninformed bidders earn more than they would have earned by
becoming informed about the aftermarket price.
Moreover, as noted above, overbidding relative to an aftermarket price (as opposed
to one’s value) need not have negative welfare implications. If the opportunity cost of
looking up the fixed price is sufficiently high, the gains from bidding correctly in the
auction may be outweighed by the forgone gains from alternative actions. To identify the
impact of overbidding on earnings, we compute the total net gains (pii,t) for the winner of
each auction in which the winning bid was greater than the fixed price.
Figure 2 displays box-and-whisker plots of total net gains (pii,t) of auction winners
who submitted bids greater than the fixed price for each level of opportunity cost k (i.e.
those bidders subject to the bidder’s curse). In general, overbidding the fixed price had a
positive impact on monetary earnings after taking into account earnings from the slider
task; auction bidders who did not lookup the aftermarket price, overbid, and then won
the auction earned an average of 27 ECU. Table 4 decomposes these earnings and shows
that they would have earned only 4 ECU on average had they instead become informed
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Figure 2: Box-and-whisker plots of total net gains (auction earnings + slider earnings)
in ECU, for auction winners with bi,t > qt, conditional on the decision to lookup the
posted price.
and bid the aftermarket price (qt). Gains from the slider task swamp any losses from
overbidding. Cf. Figure 3, which displays empirical cumulative distribution functions of
observed differences between the auction price and the fixed price, conditional on whether
the bidder chose to lookup the fixed price.
Finding 4: Bidders subject to the bidder’s curse (i.e. bi,t > qt) earn positive payoffs on
average and earn more than they would have earned by becoming informed.
Uninformed Informed
(Actual) (Counterfactual)
Net Auction Savings (qt − pt) 0.48 4.11
Slider Task Earnings 26.65 0
Total Payoff (pii,t) 27.13 4.11
Table 4: Earnings among overbidders who win the auction.
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Figure 3: CDFs of net auction savings (pt − qt) for auction winners conditional on the
decision to lookup the fixed price and the value of k
4.3 Bidding Strategies
In addition to the general implication that the opportunity cost of acquiring informa-
tion about the aftermarket price drives overbidding, the model makes specific testable
predictions about subjects’ bidding strategies, conditional on information acquisition. In
equilibrium, informed subjects bid the aftermarket price, and uninformed subjects bid
the expected aftermarket price, Eq, which may be greater or lower than the actual after-
market price. With our parameters, on average, they neither overbid nor underbid the
aftermarket price.
To test these predictions, we report GLS panel regressions where the dependent vari-
able is the difference between the bid and the aftermarket price, and the independent
variables include a constant term and a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the bidder chose
to lookup the price and 0 otherwise. We include random effects for each subject to con-
trol for repeated measures and we cluster standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the regression results. A positive and significant coefficient
on the Constant term indicates that uninformed subjects overbid the aftermarket price by
6 ECU on average, so that bids are biased upward relative to the theory. In contrast, bids
made by informed bidders seem to be unbiased: The negative and significant coefficient
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on the Lookup dummy indicates that informed bidders reduce their bids significantly, and
a Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Constant term and the Lookup
term sum to 0, meaning that overbidding among informed subjects is not significantly
different from 0.
Bid - Aftermarket Price Bid
bi,t − qt bi,t
Lookup, (λi,t) -4.766
∗∗∗ -20.782∗∗∗
(1.735) (2.299)
Lookup × Aftermarket Price 0.597∗∗∗
(0.066)
Constant 6.375∗∗∗ 32.398∗∗∗
(1.817) (1.604)
R2 0.012 0.125
N 1024 1024
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: GLS regression analysis of bidding behavior.
The second regression in Table 5 allows us to compare observed behavior directly to
the bidding strategies predicted by the theory. We report GLS panel regressions in which
the dependent variable is the bid, and the independent variables include a constant term,
a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the bidder chose to lookup the price and 0 otherwise,
and an interaction between the aftermarket price and the lookup dummy, which allows
us to test the extent to which informed subjects’ bids reflect the aftermarket price. We
include random effects for each subject to control for repeated measures, and we cluster
standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.
Column (2) of Table 5 displays the regression output. Informed bidders should bid
exactly the aftermarket price, which implies that the coefficient on the Lookup × After-
market Price interaction will equal 1 and that the sum of the coefficients on the Constant
term and the Lookup dummy will equal to 0. Uninformed bidders, on the other hand,
should bid Eq, which implies that the coefficient on the Constant term will equal 25 ECU,
given our distribution of aftermarket prices. The regression coefficients reveal that un-
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informed bidders overbid substantially, and although informed subjects’ bids respond
significantly to the aftermarket price, and the lookup dummy is substantially negative,
we still observe a tendency to overbid the aftermarket price on average. A Wald test
rejects the joint hypothesis that all of the predictions are true (χ2 = 22.81, p-value <
0.01). We summarize the regression results as follows.
Finding 5: Subjects on average tend to overbid relative to the theoretical predictions
whether they inform themselves about the aftermarket price or not, although upward bias
is pronounced only among uninformed bidders.
In addition to being slightly too high on average, bids in the experiment are also more
diffuse than the equilibrium (point) predicts, especially among uninformed bidders (see
Figure 4). For informed subjects, 13% of all bids are exactly equal to the aftermarket
price, while 31% are within 1 ECU of the aftermarket price. Nearly half of all informed
bids are within 5 ECU of the aftermarket price and 70% of all such bids are within
10 ECU. Uninformed subjects also do not bid exactly as predicted by the theory. In fact,
only 7% of uninformed bids are exactly equal to Eq, i.e. 25 ECU, while only 12% are
within 1 ECU and 51% within 10 ECU.
Finding 6: Bids are more diffuse than predicted by the theory, particularly when subjects
are uninformed.
4.4 Behavioral Explanations of Bidding
Overbidding and excess bid dispersion by uninformed subjects remains a puzzle. One
candidate explanation comes from the Malmendier and Lee (2011) notion of limited at-
tention. We note that our data are inconsistent with bidders having limited attention in
the sense described in their Proposition 3. If subjects simply ignore the aftermarket fixed
price option, then it is optimal for them to bid bi = vi as in Vickrey (1961). Only 4 out
of 1024 bids are equal to vi and 9% of bids are greater than 50 (the minimum of vi), so
this cannot explain our data.
Another possibility is that Finding 5 may be related to existing evidence of on average
overbidding in second price auctions without an aftermarket (Kagel and Levin, 1993;
Ariely et al., 2005; Cooper and Fang, 2008; Georganas et al., 2017).13 We observe no
13Unlike a standard clock auction that ends when only one bidder remains, our auction does not have
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Figure 4: Histograms of deviations from equilibrium bidding (b∗ − bi,t)
consistent trends in the likelihood of overbidding across auctions; for example, informed
(uninformed) subjects overbid with probability 0.36 (0.57) in the first five auctions and
probability 0.32 (0.55) in the final five auctions. This is consistent with prior evidence, in
which even substantial experience does not eliminate overbidding (Kagel and Levin, 1993);
however, we cannot rule out the possibility that additional experience would eventually
eliminate overbidding.
Nevertheless, our data cannot be explained by many leading models that have been
used to account for overbidding. For instance, introducing an additively-separable utility
of winning would counterfactually predict a similar degree of overbidding by both informed
and uninformed bidders (Cox et al., 1988). Furthermore, while the level-k model has been
successful in explaining overbidding in other settings (e.g. Crawford and Iriberri, 2007), it
cannot explain overbidding in a second-price auction under the standard assumption that
the level-0 type uniformly randomizes over bids, since informed bidders have a weakly
dominant strategy to bid q and uninformed bidders of level-1 and higher would have a
best response of bidding Eq.
a solution in obviously-dominant strategies in the sense of Li (2015). Li suggests this might explain why
past studies have tended to find less overbidding in ascending clock auctions than in otherwise equivalent
second-price sealed-bid auctions. Our finding of overbidding lends support to his claim.
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One possible explanation relies on noisy behavior, as captured by quantal response
equilibrium (Goeree et al., 2016). QRE assumes that each player behaves stochastically,
but is more likely to choose actions that yield a higher expected value, given the stochastic
behavior of other players. Thus the model can account for bid dispersion relative to the
PBE. Moreover, in our setting QRE can generate more dispersion in bids by uninformed
than by informed bidders (consistent with Finding 6) and overbidding on average for both
informed and uninformed bidders (consistent with Finding 5).14
To see the intuition for higher dispersion among the uninformed, consider the incen-
tives faced by agents when others play according to the PBE strategies given in section
2. Notice that an uninformed bidder will be indifferent across all bids. When combined
with QRE assumptions, the presence of this “flat maximum” generates dispersion in bids
for the uninformed.15 Also note that a given informed bidder strictly prefers to place a
winning bid when the aftermarket price exceeds 25 and to place a losing bid when the
aftermarket price is below 25. This intuition also extends to the QRE model where play is
noisy, and players anticipate the noisy play of others. Under QRE informed bidders have
incentives to bid close to q, while uninformed bidders have relatively weaker incentives to
bid close to 25. Together these forces will tend to generate more dispersion in the bids of
uninformed bidders relative to informed bidders.
To see the intuition for why QRE generates overbidding, note that the expected payoff
consequences of deviations are roughly symmetric around the PBE bid. Since possible
deviations are truncated below by 0 and above by 105, there are more possible deviant
overbids than underbids. As a result, noise in the QRE will tend to generate overbidding
on average and at the median. Then, since uninformed bidders exhibit more dispersion,
they will tend to overbid more in the model.
In Appendix C we explore this intuition quantitatively by estimating a QRE model
to our bidding data and describing how the fit model can help explain some features, as
well as some features of our data that the model gets wrong. The main results of this
exercise give a quantitative sense of the extent to which the intuition above can explain
bid dispersion and overbidding, and are summarized in Finding 7.
14Another implication of QRE is that there is a positive probability that a subject will not buy in the
aftermarket after losing in the auction, even though doing so is always payoff-maximizing. Surprisingly,
this implication of QRE finds some qualitative support in the data. 12/64 subjects failed to purchase in
the aftermarket after losing in the auction at least once. One subject did so 7 times, and in total there
were 29 instances out of 512 in which auction losers failed to purchase in the aftermarket.
15The flat maximum problem is well-known in the context of second-price auctions (Harrison, 1989).
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Finding 7: A model of noisy behavior can plausibly account for both observed overbid-
ding and excess dispersion.
5 Discussion
Our data suggest that overbidding a fixed price option becomes more likely as the op-
portunity cost of acquiring price information increases - consistent with the comparative
statics of our model. We show that this drives much of the observed ex-post overbidding,
which is commonly called the bidder’s curse.16 While the data are not perfectly con-
sistent with the theory, they nevertheless support an interpretation in terms of rational
ignorance.
While we were motivated by an online pricing puzzle, we believe our results may be
useful for the study of anomalies in markets more generally. One broader implication of
this paper is that it can be important to account for opportunity costs of attention in
constructing a theoretical benchmark against which we might define behavior as anoma-
lous. When opportunity cost is uncontrolled and unobservable, as in the field, behavior
that appears consistent with the bidder’s curse may instead reflect rational ignorance.
The presence of such tradeoffs is not unique to auction environments, and the opportu-
nity cost frugality of many human decision-making processes is well-known (Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 1996). In this sense, our results are analogous to previous findings that
rationalize price dispersion via heterogeneous search costs, for example, the finding that
unemployed people and retirees are more likely to buy items at a discount and use coupons
(Narasimhan, 1984; Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Kaplan and Menzio, 2015). In that setting
as in ours, accounting for opportunity cost makes specific predictions about who will and
won’t “overpay”, and if we ignore opportunity cost, higher prices paid by some buyers
might be mistaken for a more general “buyer’s curse”.
16As noted earlier, a similar mechanism can explain the apparently aberrant phenomenon of jump
bidding (Easley and Tenorio, 2004). In a multi-round auction in which submitting an additional bid is
(opportunity) costly, jump bidding reduces incurred costs. We conjecture that a hypothetical experiment
similar to ours, in which subjects must forgo a potential gain each time they submit a new bid would also
likely demonstrate that the frequency and magnitude of jump bidding is increasing in the opportunity
cost of the marginal bid.
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Appendix (for online publication)
A Theoretical Results
Lemma 1. Given ρ, a there exists a value of b? that solves the equation (1).
Proof. The left-hand side of (1) is decreasing in b? and the right-hand side increasing,
both sides continuously since G has a continuous density. The right-hand side achieves a
value of 0 at b? = 0 and (1− ρn−1− (1− ρ)n−1) (q¯ − Eq) > 0 at q = q¯. The left-hand side
achieves a value of (1 − ρ)n−1Eq > 0 at b? = 0 and a value of (1 − ρ)n−1 [Eq − q¯] < 0 at
b? = q¯.
Lemma 2. In any symmetric PBE, informed bidders bid q with probability 1.
Proof. Consider a candidate set of symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies.
Suppose that each player becomes informed with a strictly positive probability ex-ante.
Without loss of generality, a given player i can view other players’ strategies as inducing
a single (aggregate) mixed continuation bidding strategy over bids used by all informed
players when q is the aftermarket price. Let σ denote the cumulative distribution func-
tion induced by this mixed strategy. Similarly, we can view the continuation strategies
used when players choose to be uninformed as a inducing a single (aggregate) mixed
continuation bidding strategy over bids used by all uninformed players.
For this set of candidate strategies to be supportable in a symmetric equilibrium, a
player who is informed that the aftermarket price is q must be indifferent between any bids
in the support of σ. The verbal argument below establishes that if σ puts a strictly positive
probability on bids not equal to q, then bidding q achieves a strictly lower expected price
than some bid in the support of σ.
So suppose that σ puts a strictly positive probability on bids strictly below q. Then
if i bids q, the case where −i all bid less than q occurs with strictly positive probability;
in this case, i would pay the highest bid of −i, which is strictly less than q. But if i
had instead made a bid b < q in the support of σ for which σ(q) > σ(b), i would pay
the same price as if she had bid q when −i all bid strictly below b. She must sometimes
lose to bids equal to or exceeding b, in which case she would pay q in the aftermarket.
If instead she had bid q, she would pay a price strictly below q. When −i have at least
one bid exceeding q, bidding q and bidding b will both lose and result in paying the same
aftermarket price. Thus, bidding q must lead to a strictly lower interim expected price
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than bidding b in this case. It follows that σ cannot induce bids strictly below q with
positive probability.
Similarly, if σ prescribes that bids strictly exceed q with strictly positive probability,
we can apply the same logic to show that bidding q would always lead to a weakly lower
price paid, and would with strictly positive probability lead to a strictly lower price paid
than some bid exceeding q in the support of σ. Thus σ must prescribe bidding q with a
probability of one.
Lemma 3. In any symmetric PBE, uninformed bidders pay an expected price of Eq.
Proof. Consider candidate symmetric PBE strategies. Without loss of generality, view
continuation strategies used conditional on remaining uninformed as inducing a single
aggregate mixed continuation bidding strategy which generates a cumulative distribution
function σ for uninformed types; let Q denote its support.
In a symmetric PBE, each uninformed player must be indifferent between bidding
any point in the support of σ. If σ(q¯) < 1, then any player i could achieve a higher
ex-ante payoff than any mixed strategy that prescribes bidding above q with positive
probability by modifying the continuation strategy to change bids above q¯ to q and this
would contradict our assumption that σ forms part of a PBE. Thus σ(q¯) = 1.
Let bˆ = sup [b : σ(b) = 0]. If σ(bˆ) = 0, then there must a sequence bn in Q with bn → bˆ.
Since each bn ∈ Q, each must yield the same expected price. Along this sequence, the
equilibrium probability of winning the auction with a bid of bn goes to zero; when a bid
of bn wins the auction, the ex-post payment is bounded by max[bn, q] while the payment
is q when the bid of bn loses the auction. Thus, as bn → bˆ, bidder i’s expected payment
for the good converges to Eq. Thus the expected price paid conditional on becoming
uninformed must be Eq for all bids made by uninformed bidders in any symmetric PBE
in which σ(bˆ) = 0.
Now suppose σ(bˆ) > 0. Then (due to the tie breaking rule) the expected price paid
when bidding bˆ is a convex combination of the expected prices paid in the limit of sequences
of bids converging to bˆ from above and from below. But when making any bid below bˆ, a
bidder always loses when an uninformed type is present, always pays q when an informed
type is present, and thus has an expected price of Eq. Thus for her to be willing to bid bˆ
(rather than below or slightly above), she must be indifferent between bidding below bˆ and
the limit of bids converging to bˆ from above. Thus the expected price for an uninformed
player who bids bˆ must be Eq in a symmetric equilibrium; thus an uninformed player’s
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expected price given any bid in Q must be Eq.
Lemma 4. When n = 2, in any symmetric PBE, uninformed bidders bid Eq with proba-
bility of 1.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary symmetric PBE. Summarize the probability distribution
over other players’ bidding strategy when uninformed by cumulative distribution function
H, and let ρ denote the ex-ante probability that each other player becomes informed.
Then, the expected price to a given uninformed bidder of bidding bi is given by:
(1− p)
 bi∫
q
bdH(b) + (1−H(bi))Eq
+ ρEq
This is weakly decreasing in bi when bi < Eq and weakly increasing in bi when bi > Eq
and when compared to bidding bi = Eq, any bid b′i < Eq must yield a strictly higher
expected price whenever H assigns positive probability to to the interval [b′i,Eq). Thus
H must assign a probability of zero to bids below Eq. By a similar argument, H must
assign a probability of zero to bids above Eq. Thus, uninformed bidders must bid b? = Eq
with a probability of one in any symmetric PBE.
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B Screenshots and Instructions
B.1 Screenshots
Below we include screenshots of the sequence of decisions made by subjects. At the end
of the market, a new market started over and went through an identical sequence until
all 16 markets were complete.
Figure B1: Screenshot of basic information
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Figure B2: Screenshot of bidder value information
Figure B3: Screenshot of information acquisition decision
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Figure B4: Screenshot for bidders who lookup the aftermarket price
Figure B5: Screenshot for bidders who choose the slider task
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Figure B6: Screenshot of preliminary auction information
Figure B7: Screenshot before the clock starts ticking
34
Figure B8: Screenshot of an active bidder during the auction
Figure B9: Screenshot after dropping out of the auction
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Figure B10: Screenshot of the aftermarket for the auction loser
Figure B11: Screenshot summarizing the outcome for the auction winner
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B.2 Instructions
 
General information 
You are now participating in a decision making experiment. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a 
considerable amount of money depending on your decisions, the decisions of the other participants, and an element 
of chance.  
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate 
with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and we will come to your seat and 
answer privately. Any violation of this rule excludes you immediately from the experiment.  
During the experiment the outcome of your decisions will be measured in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) 
instead of Dollars. We will convert your total earnings into Dollars at a rate of 10 ECU = 1 Dollar at the end of the 
experiment and pay you in cash privately. 
 
Outline of the Experiment 
This experiment consists of 16 periods in which you can buy a fictitious object in either an auction market or an 
aftermarket. Each fictitious object will have some “value” to you – you can think of your value as the amount 
of money (in ECU) that the experimenter will pay you for the object if you buy it. So, if you have a value of 80 
ECU for the object, and you buy it at a price P, you will earn 80 minus the price (80 – P) ECU.  
In each period, your value will be a random whole number between 50 and 100 ECU. Each value is equally likely. 
You will have a new random value in each period.  
The period starts with an auction. There are 2 bidders in each auction, you and someone else. The other person 
bidding with you in each auction will change randomly.  
Other people also receive random values between 50 and 100 ECU for each object (with each value being equally 
likely), and all values are determined independently of one another. You will only know your own value, and the 
other person in your auction will only know his/her own value. 
At the end of each auction, the person who submitted the highest bid receives the object. If there is a tie for the 
high bid, the object is assigned to one of the bidders by chance.  
If you do not submit the highest bid, then you will not receive the object in the auction. However, anyone who did 
not buy the object in the auction can buy an identical object after the auction at a fixed price that is the same 
for you and the other person in your auction. This price is called the aftermarket price, and it will be any 
number between 0 and 50 ECU where each number is equally likely. Since the object for sale at the aftermarket 
price is identical to the auctioned object, you have the same value for it as for the auctioned object. 
So, if your value is 80 ECU, and the aftermarket price is 42 ECU, and you choose to buy the object after the 
auction, you would receive 80 – 42 = 38 ECU.   
Before these 16 periods you will participate in 3 rounds of a “Slider Task” in which you earn money by 
manipulating objects on the computer screen. You will be paid for your performance in the 3rd round of the “Slider 
Task”. 
You start off the experiment with an endowment of 70 ECU, which corresponds to your show up payment. At the 
end of the experiment, we will pay you the total of your earnings from the Slider Task plus your earnings from 1 
randomly chosen period. This plus your Slider Task earnings will be added to your show-up payment and paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
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 Stage 1: The Slider Task Stage	
The Slider Task stage allows you to earn money from a computerized task. 
You will now participate in 3 rounds of an identical task lasting 120 seconds per round with a break of 60 seconds 
between each round. Rounds 1 and 2 allow you to practice the task and will not affect your earnings. The score that 
you will have obtained in round 3 will be used for determining your total earnings from the Slider Task Stage. 
The task will consist of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 
100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position.  
You can use the mouse or the keyboard’s arrow keys in any way you like to move each slider. To use the arrow 
keys you have to select the slider that you want to adjust first by clicking it with the mouse. You can readjust the 
position of each slider as many times as you wish. You adjust the sliders to earn points. Specifically, your “score” 
in the task will be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds.   
Your score in round 3 will be converted to ECU at a rate of 1 point = 1 ECU. For example, if after 120 seconds 
you have correctly placed 6 sliders at 50, then you have earned 6 points, which is converted to 6 ECU and will be 
paid to you at the end of the experiment.  
Thus your Slider Earnings are equal to (Your Score in the third round x 1 ECU) 
Are there any questions? 
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 Stage 2: The Market Stage	
Each period consists of two parts, the Auction and the Aftermarket. 
In the Auction, each person bids for the fictitious object. Before bidding, you will learn your value, and you can 
either: 
1) Look up the aftermarket price for 30 seconds before submitting your bid 
OR 
2) Participate in a 30-second round of the Slider Task to earn ECUs. 
If you choose to look up the aftermarket price, you cannot participate in the Slider Task, but for 30 seconds you 
will see the aftermarket price of an identical object that you can buy in the Aftermarket if you do not receive the 
object in the auction.  
If you choose to participate in the Slider Task, you will earn additional ECU based on your score from correctly 
adjusting sliders to 50, but cannot look up the aftermarket price before bidding. The amount of ECU that you 
receive per correctly adjusted slider will change over the 16 auctions, and you will be informed about it before you 
choose whether to participate in the task. Before each auction, the slider rate is chosen independently for each 
bidder with equal probability from 0, 0.25, 3, or 6 ECU per slider. 
The other person in your auction can also either look up the aftermarket price or participate in the Slider Task, but 
they may earn more, less or the same amount per correctly adjusted slider as you. 
At the end of 30 seconds, the bidding will begin. Your value will be displayed again. Below, in the auction panel, 
you will see a price called the clock price. The clock price will start at 0 ECU, and will increase by 1 ECU with 
each tick of the clock. The bidding starts immediately, and your bid is equal to the clock price. You can stop 
bidding and leave the auction by clicking the “Stop Bidding” button next to the clock price. Similarly, the other 
bidder can stop bidding and leave the auction. You remain actively bidding as long as you have not yet clicked 
“Stop Bidding”.  
Neither bidder will observe whether the other bidder has stopped bidding. If the other bidder leaves the auction 
while you continue bidding, the market price of the object is the clock price at which the other bidder 
stopped bidding, although you continue to see the clock price increasing until you stop bidding. Similarly, if you 
stop bidding while the other bidder continues, the market price of the object is the clock price at which you stopped 
bidding. 
After you and the other person in your auction both click “Stop Bidding”, you will see the outcome of the auction. 
The bidder who continued to bid longer and higher in the auction (the high bidder) gets the object and receives 
Auction Earnings equal to the difference between the object’s value and the price of the object; the other bidder 
receives no Auction Earnings, that is: 
- if you are the high bidder:     
o Your Auction Earnings = (Your value – market price) ECU 
If this difference is negative because the price exceeds the object’s value, then the Auction Earnings of the 
high bidder are negative, which represents a loss.   
- if you are not the high bidder:   
o Your Auction Earnings = 0 ECU 
If you stop bidding at the same price as the other bidder, chance decides who gets the object, and the price is equal 
to the clock price at which you both stopped bidding. If no one stops bidding before the clock price reaches 105 
ECU, then the object will be allocated by chance at a price of 105 ECU. 
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 If you are the high bidder so that you receive the auctioned object, you do not participate in the Aftermarket. 
However, if you are not the high bidder, you can buy an identical object in the Aftermarket. 
In the Aftermarket, you will be reminded of your value for the object (which is exactly equal to your value for the 
auctioned object) and the aftermarket price. If you want to buy the object at the aftermarket price, click the button 
labeled “Buy”. Your Aftermarket Earnings are determined as follows: 
- if you choose to buy the object in the aftermarket:     
o Your Aftermarket Earnings = (your value – aftermarket price) ECU 
- if you choose not to buy the object in the aftermarket:   
o Your Aftermarket Earnings = 0 ECU 
At the end of the Aftermarket, one period is complete. 
Your Stage 2 Earnings 
Your Earnings for an individual period can be determined in one of the following six ways: 
1) You receive the object in the auction, and you participate in the Slider Task 
 Earnings = (your value – market price + Slider Task Earnings) ECU 
2) You receive the object in the auction, and you do not participate in the Slider Task 
 Earnings = (your value – market price) ECU 
3) You do not receive the object in the auction, you participate in the Slider Task, and you choose to buy an 
object in the Aftermarket. 
 Earnings = (your value – aftermarket price + Slider Task Earnings) ECU 
4) You do not receive the object in the auction, you do not participate in the Slider Task, and you choose to 
buy an object in the Aftermarket. 
 Earnings = (your value –  aftermarket price) ECU 
5) You do not receive the object in the auction, you participate in the Slider Task, and you choose not to buy 
an object in the Aftermarket. 
 Earnings = Slider Task Earnings ECU 
6) You do not receive the object at auction, you do not participate in the Slider Task, and you choose not to 
buy an object in the Aftermarket. 
 Earnings = 0 ECU 
Total Earnings 
Now we will do 2 practice auctions, to familiarize you with the interface. These will not count for payment. After 
the practice, we will restart the experiment. At the end of the experiment, we will randomly draw 1 out of the 16 
periods for payment. If your stage 2 earnings are positive, then your ECU balance increases by this amount. If your 
earnings are negative, you made a loss and your ECU balance decreases by the amount of the loss. If your earnings 
are 0 ECU, then your ECU balance does not change. Finally, we will add your earnings from the Slider Task stage 
(Stage 1) to your ECU balance and we will convert it to Dollars at a rate of 10 ECU = 1 Dollar. When the 
experiment is over, please wait quietly until we call you for payment.  
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C Estimates of a QRE model of bidding behavior
To investigate the extent to which noisy behavior can explain observed dispersion in bids
and overbidding, we estimated a QRE model of bidding behavior, taking information
acquisition decisions as a given. In our QRE model, each agent noisily chooses among
strategies, with a greater tendency to choose strategies with higher expected payoffs,
given the behavior of other agents. We model a player’s behavior in the aftermarket as
governed by a separate and independent agent (as in “Agent-Based QRE”; see section 3.2
in Goeree et al., 2016). Behavior is assumed to follow a logit form, with the parameter
α capturing the degree of noisiness. Our model assumes that heterogeneity in behavior,
given an agent’s information arises only due to random variation, rather than underlying
individual differences – which gives us a one-parameter generalization of the standard
theory in section 2.17
In the aftermarket, an agent with valuation v who faces aftermarket price q buys the
object with probability
p(v, q) =
exp (α (v − q))
exp (α (v − q)) + exp (0) (10)
and otherwise does not buy.
Let i ∈ {50, . . . , 100} × ({0, . . . , 50} ∪ {uninformed}) denote a player’s information,
which consists of her valuation of the object and either knowing the aftermarket price
or being uninformed. Let ρ denote the fraction of the time that each agent becomes
informed, which we take as exogenous for the purpose of this exercise.18 Let σ′, p′ denote
the stochastic response functions in the auction and aftermarket played by other agents,
and let U(b|i)(σ′, p′) denote the expected utility of bidding b given the behavior of other
agents. Then, assume a player’s probability of making bid b given information i is given
by:
σ(b, i) =
exp (αU (b, i) (σ′, p′))
105∑
b′=0
exp (αU (b′, i) (σ′, p′))
(11)
The value of U(b|i)(σ′, p′) is given by:
17An extension of the model that allows α to vary between informed and uninformed agents yielded
very similar estimates of α for both.
18Note that, due to the logit functional form, this model predicts that earnings from the slider task
will not affect subsequent behavior in the auction and aftermarket.
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U(b|(v, q))(σ′, p′) =
ρ
(
1
51
100∑
v′=50
[
b−1∑
b′=0
σ′(b′|(v′, q)) (v − b′) + 1
2
σ′(b|(v′, q)) (v − b)
+
(
1
2
σ′(b|(q, v′)) +
106∑
b′=b+1
σ′(b′|v′, q)
)
p′(v, q)
(
v − q
)])
(12)
+ (1− ρ)
(
b−1∑
b′=0
σ′(b′|(v′, uninformed)) (v − b′) + 1
2
σ′(b|(v′, uninformed)) (v − b)
+
(
1
2
σ′(b|(q, v′)) +
106∑
b′=b+1
σ′(b′|v′, uninformed)
)
p′(v, q)
(
v − q
))
U(b|(v, uninformed))(σ′, p′) =
ρ
(
1
51
50∑
q=0
1
51
100∑
v′=50
[
b−1∑
b′=0
σ′(b′|(v′, q)) (v − b′) + 1
2
σ′(b|(v′, q)) (v − b)
+
(
1
2
σ′(b|(q, v′)) +
106∑
b′=b+1
σ′(b′|v′, q)
)
p′(v, q)
(
v − q
)])
(13)
+ (1− ρ)
(
b−1∑
b′=0
σ′(b′|(v′, uninformed)) (v − b′) + 1
2
σ′(b|(v′, uninformed)) (v − b)
+
(
1
2
σ′(b|(q, v′)) +
106∑
b′=b+1
σ′(b′|v′, uninformed)
)
1
51
50∑
q=0
p′(v, q)
(
v − q
))
A strategy σ?, p? is an equilibrium when p? is given by (10), and given U(b, i)(σ?, p?)
computed according to (12 and 13), σ? is consistent with (11).
We constructed a program in R (2015) to find the QRE strategies σα and pα corre-
sponding to α as follows. By Proposition 3.1 in Goeree et al. (2016), a QRE exists in our
problem. Our program starts with random behavior, and then iteratively solves for the
response functions using (2) until strategies have converged. Notice that choice probabil-
ities in this model are continuous in utility and in α, and utility is in turn continuous in
the strategy of other agents. As a result, the program will find strategies arbitrarily close
to a QRE.19
19We have not proven that the QRE is unique; by starting this process from uniform random behavior,
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QRE model fit
αˆ .46
s.e. .02
Table C1: Estimated α from the QRE Model
Given σα, we can construct the contribution of a given bid to the likelihood function:
ll(b, i|α) = σα(b, i)
and given pα, the contribution of an aftermarket decision to the likelihood function is
given by:
ll(buy, v, q|α) = pα(v, q)
ll(don’t buy, v, q|α) = 1− pα(v, q)
We estimate α by maximum likelihood using the mle command.20 Our results are reported
in Table C1.
Table C2 compares the bidding predictions generated by our estimated QRE model
against the core features of our bidding data that were reported in our results section. The
estimates suggest that QRE can help account for some of our observations such as excess
bid dispersion and on-average overbidding, especially among the uninformed. However,
in some ways QRE predicts “too much” noise and fails to capture the relatively close
adherence to dominant strategy bidding by the informed. We summarize the evidence
below.
Notice that overbidding is substantially more pronounced by uninformed bidders rela-
tive to informed bidders, and uninformed bidders also appear noisier relative to the PBE
predictions: informed bidders are substantially more likely to bid close to the PBE point
prediction. In the model, this can only arise out of weaker payoff incentives for uninformed
than for informed bidders to adhere to the PBE strategy. It appears that overbidding
our approach will select the “logit solution”, which is common practice in estimating the QRE model
(see Goeree et al., 2016, p. 152).
20Note that the standard errors displayed assume that each observation (i.e. each bid and each after-
market decision) is independent. Since we are not primarily interested in inference about α, we do not
make corrections to account for interdependencies among observations.
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is driven by the conjunction of noisy behavior and a strategy space that always contains
more bids above the PBE point prediction than below. Since noise in the QRE model
generates a positive probability of making each possible bid, it tends to produce more
overbidding than underbidding both on average and at the median; since uninformed
bidders have weaker incentives and make more dispersed bids, they tend to overbid more
than informed bidders; see Figure C1.
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Figure C1: The distribution of bids by informed and uninformed bidders under QRE
The model does not capture the very-close adherence to the dominant strategy by
a large fraction of informed bids. Instead it predicts noisy behavior more continuously
about those predictions. One possible explanation is that bidding around the aftermarket
price is salient and/or cognitively easy to identify for some subjects when informed.
We also note that the estimated model actually underestimates the frequency at which
subjects fail to buy when in the aftermarket, predicting that players who reach the after-
market only fail to buy 0.2% of the time (while players fail to buy 5.7% of the time in our
data). This suggests that, in the estimated model, the anticipation of potentially failing
to buy in the aftermarket does not drive much overbidding (nor differential overbidding).
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Deviation of bids
Uninformed Informed
from point predictions
+-1 7.8% (11.7%) 11.8% (30.8%)
+-5 27.8% (30.4%) 38.7% (54.7%)
+-10 49.4% (51.2%) 61.1% (70.2%)
median 27 (30) 26 (25)
average 30.2 (32.4) 29.9 (27.0)
Table C2: Model-predictions of the % of bids for a given information type that fit
within specified bounds of the PBE point predictions; corresponding figures from data in
brackets
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